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A taste of evil

If you go into an ice cream parlor these days, you’re apt to be offered a free sample. You walk in, and some cheery college student (who really ought to be reading a book or doing problem sets or something) says, “Would you like to sample our new chocolate cream mousse pistachio mint mango raspberry radicchio flavor? It’s free!” After wondering a bit what language you’ve just heard, you say OK, helping yourself to a tiny sample of what’s on offer, and steeling yourself to leave it at that, for God’s sake. Within minutes, of course, you find yourself buying and consuming a gallon of ice cream on the spot, and resolving never to walk into this den of iniquity again–at least until tomorrow.

Anyway–long preface I know–but this post is a free sample of evil, gleaned from a few days’ reading of my fave newspaper, The New York Times.  The aim here is not to induce you to swallow any more evil, but to spit out (or throw up) whatever portion you may unwittingly have taken in and digested. In addition, I hope to induce you to reflect on the banality of evil, which exhibits itself throughout. (I had to throw that last part in, because no discussion of evil is allowed to take place in this post-Arendtian age unless allusion is made to “the banality of evil,” despite the fact that no one–including Hannah Arendt–has ever known what “the banality of evil” is supposed to mean.)

(1) Sample 1: housing regulation cobbler

America’s left-wingers are very angry nowadays at its right-wingers. That’s because the left is convinced that regulation will save us from the evils of selfishness and greed, and their baneful effects, poverty and inequality. Meanwhile, the right is generally anti-regulatory in economic matters, which seems to imply to many people that it is in favor of selfishness, greed, poverty, and inequality.

All this brings us to the strange case of the housing market. An editorial in The New York Times this week defends the New Jersey Supreme Court’s re-affirmation of the Mt. Laurel housing decision on the grounds that Mt. Laurel rectifies exclusionary zoning, a barrier to entry into the market.

The New Jersey Supreme Court has wisely rejected an attempt by Gov. Chris Christie to undermine its 30-year-old-ruling in the Mount Laurel fair housing case, one of the more important civil rights decisions of the modern era. In last week’s strongly worded decision, the court made clear that it would be keeping a close eye on both the Christie administration and wealthy communities that might be inclined to flout the law, which limits the use of exclusionary zoning as a means of preventing the construction of affordable housing.

I agree with Mt. Laurel, at least as a stop-gap remedy for exclusionary zoning, which seems to me much worse in its effects than the inclusionary zoning that Mt. Laurel demands. It seems to have escaped the Times’s notice, however, that zoning is not exactly a right-wing idea, and that the “wealthy communities” in question are not exactly right-wing enclaves, either. It also seems to have escaped notice that “limiting the use of exclusionary zoning” is a form of de-regulation that permits the construction of affordable housing that zoning and other regulations inhibit. In my experience, this last thought tends to be too much for the average New Jersey liberal to process; in lieu of processing it, we’re obliged to go back to execration of the conspicuously overweight Chris Christie, using his excessive weight as a metaphor for the gluttony of the market, Republicans, developers, and other stereotypical specimens of human depravity. One day, however, perhaps people will discover that judgments of appearance are really not a reliable proxy for moral judgments, and then come to realize that making fun of Chris Christie’s weight is not in fact a proxy for thinking about the housing market. We can all dream.

Anyway, flip a few pages back in the same day’s edition of the Times, and you can read a great story, “Tenant’s Fine for Renting to Tourist Is Overturned.” Once you get past the banal details of the story, and the totalitarian name of the agency involved (“the Environmental Control Board“), you’ll realize that the real story is this: the City of New York actually has a law on its books that criminalizes the subletting of one’s apartment–regardless of the content of the lease or the permission of one’s landlord–to anyone for even a few days. Many diverse points of view are mentioned in the article, discussing various fine points about “fairness,” but apparently the reporter could find no one to question the “fairness” of the law itself, much less the procedural problematics of a regulatory agency that functions as a de facto police department. (“911, what is your emergency?” –“My quality of life is under attack! A profitable and voluntary exchange is taking place right next to me! I…I can’t move…my apartment is rent-controlled…” –“Hold on, sir; ECB units are en route.”)

So I’ll question it. It’s one thing, and perhaps an unfair thing, that rental leases are often written so as to prevent sub-leasing. But in my experience in New Jersey, one can often get around such explicit prohibitions by means of the commodity known as “persuasion.” Carrie-Ann and I once managed to convince our tough Jersey landlord to allow us to sublet our apartment to someone for six months. He pointed out at first that the lease disallowed subletting, whereupon we responded that he was lord and master of the lease, rather than the other way around, and that it should be his pleasure to dictate terms to the lease rather than let that peasant-like document push him around. Acknowledging this insight with a favorable but wordless gesture, he indicated his acquiescence in our subletting proposal. So reader, we sublet it (the apartment). The anecdote (and frankly, the ease of the negotiation) indicates that even with an unfavorable lease, subletting is at least possible and legal in New Jersey. 

Oh, but not in New York. Try it, and whatever your lease says, whatever your landlord says, whatever agreement you manage to make between you, you’ve broken the law, and the fines begin to mount. What if you’re too poor to hire an attorney? Tough luck. What if you get evicted? Tough luck. What if you go broke? Tough luck. What if it was financial problems that induced you to sublease in the first place? Tough luck. Tough luck: thus speak the champions of affordable housing and “environmental control.” I guess people are the main part of the “environment” they’d like to control. A right-wing Republican conspiracy against the poor? Not exactly. Evil? I’d say so.

Here’s my question: how long can the left go on pretending that an a priori default position in favor of, say, existing housing regulations makes coherent sense and benefits the poor? If we can’t assume that the existing structure of property relations benefits the poor, why assume that the existing structure of regulatory relations does? As an Objectivist myself, even I don’t make the first assumption. So I don’t see any reason to acquiesce in a consensus that accepts the second. (Not that the poor are the only people who count, but my point is, they do count.)

If the existing structure of regulations really doesn’t make sense or confer obvious benefits, what exactly is wrong with a zealous commitment to plowing through the statute books and deregulating the housing market, one painstaking step at a time? I know that the very word “deregulation” makes a certain kind of leftist or liberal angry, but I guess I’d like to ask whether leftists and liberals are the only people entitled to a sense of righteous indignation at the way the world works. I’m inclined to think not. It really is not clear to me why the world should be governed by “control boards” whose regulatory powers make no apparent sense. I don’t see that anyone has so far made the reasons transparent.

(2) Sample 2: sexy anorexia (in vanilla)

An article on the same page highlights the great investment we all ought to have in the self-esteem of girls and their need to cultivate a healthy body image. In fact, an article on the Op-Ed page a few weeks ago sounded the same theme. Fair enough. None of us should take pleasure in the exploitation or humiliation of others.

Now turn three pages to the fashion section of the Times, where you get to read–with no sense of irony or consciousness of absurdity–about deathly emaciated models showing off fashions that literally seem fashioned to be devices of torture. I guess you’re supposed to take pleasure in the display, though I’m not sure how anyone could. Take a look.

I can't even manage a smart-ass comment on this one.

I can’t even manage a smart-ass comment on this one.

Our fashion correspondent has a lot of BS to sling at readers about the “endearing” yet “naïve” “idealism” of the scene just above. Right. Actually, I was thinking that I’ve seen impoverished children in the inner city of Lahore who look better nourished than the four women pictured here.

So here’s a thought: maybe the City of New York, in its solicitude for the self-image of “girls,” might begin its crusade with some (purely verbal) criticisms of the Times’s fashion pages, following which the Times can cover the story with a story on itself, followed by some serious editorial tongue self-lashings about its own callous insensitivity as a journalistic institution. I mean surely revenue can’t be the relevant consideration here, can it? I can’t imagine that the Times outdoes Maxim and Playboy in overlooking the obvious exploitation here simply to make a buck. That would certainly call its moral credibility into question. It might even be evil.

(3) Sample 3: rocky road

An article on p. A16 of the same day’s paper details an (alleged) attack by a bunch of motorcyclists on a driver on the Henry Hudson Parkway. The facts are not in, so I am, ex hypothesi, going to treat the facts that have emerged so far as though they were true. They may end up being false, but adjudication of the case as such is not my topic here.

Suppose the facts are as reported, and assume that the victim had a right of self-defense. I assume, then, that he could have exercised that right. How? Well, one obvious way might have been to call the police. But the police weren’t there, and wouldn’t have gotten there on time. Another way was to use his vehicle as a weapon against his attackers. Evidently, that’s what he did, and he hasn’t been charged with any crime for doing so. Inference: using your vehicle to run someone over when you’re under attack by a mob–even someone not directly attacking you–is not obviously a legal predicate for battery. Prima facie, it may well be a case of self-defense, even according to the NYPD.

So here’s a question: what if the victim had had a firearm in his possession? Could he, morally speaking, have turned it on his attackers to defend himself?

My answer is “yes,” but that is not how this reader (in the same day’s letters column) thinks about things. The “you” is the Times’s editorial board, and the “service” is an earlier editorial.

To the Editor:

You have performed a necessary service in emphasizing the unnecessary deaths, injuries and destroyed lives based on our country’s gun culture. I have contributed to several gun control groups, but have come to realize that while they do some good, they are basically ineffective, because their goal is gun control.

Gun control concedes the National Rifle Association’s contention that the Second Amendment gives most Americans an absolute right to own or use guns. This is not true.

I suggest that the phrase “gun control” be replaced with “no guns.” If such a notion were carried out, this would free us of the shame of legalized killings.

ROBERT GELMAN
Ann Arbor, Mich., Sept. 29, 2013

But if “such a notion were carried out,” wouldn’t we also be “freed” of a right of self-defense in cases like the preceding one?

Here, I’d pose a version of the problem I posed in a previous post about health care: how is it in the self-interest of a potential victim of violence to relinquish all rights to possession of firearms? And who isn’t a potential victim of violence?

Either it is in our self-interest, or it isn’t. If it is, how is it? What benefit do all of us get from everyone’s indiscriminately being debarred from acquiring firearms? If it isn’t, why should anyone sacrifice his self-interest (i.e., his right to effective self-defense) for the sake of Robert Gelman’s policy prescriptions? I don’t ask the question because I want to buy a gun (I don’t feel the need for one). I ask the question because I can imagine that someone else might legitimately want to.  Apparently, Robert Gelman seems to lack the requisite capacity for moral imagination.

Of course, like so many letters published in the Times, Gelman’s letter equivocates on the key point, and thereby manages to have things all ways at once. Is he against guns as such, or is he against an “absolute” right for anyone to have any gun one wants, whenever one wants, to use it any way one wants, etc.? Read the first way, his letter makes no sense; read the other way, it evades the relevant issue.  As for the right to self-defense, one gets the impression from what Gelman says that in the clutch situation, one is to face down one’s attackers armed only with lethal cliches about gun control. But I wonder whether that would actually work against a determined attacker, and somehow doubt that it would.

I wanted to highlight two distinct evils in this section of my post–the people who attacked that motorist on the Henry Hudson, and people like Robert Gelman, who would like to pretend that you can dispose of the idea of a right to firearms by generating hot air about the gun culture and NRA. The first evil is obvious, the second subtler. But a piece of advice for anyone who espouses the second sort of view: try facing someone who wants to kill you with that attitude, and see how far you get.

(4) Sample 4: Nixonian-Kissingerian genocidal swirl

Now that we’re talking about death, I figure I can safely bring up the evilest thing on today’s agenda of evil, namely genocide.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger are not the most popular figures in American politics, but despite the decades-long efforts of the late Christopher Hitchens, Kissinger at least is still regarded as a respectable senior sage on the American scene, and Nixon sometimes gets some passing affection. Put it this way: it’s doubtful that when Kissinger kicks the bucket, his obituaries will come right out and call him a criminal or a madman. And I think few have really pondered the possibility that we were, during the Nixon presidency, governed by a kind of psychopath. But both hypotheses are seriously worth considering.

I haven’t read it, but I’m impressed by descriptions I’ve read of Gary Bass’s new book on Kissinger’s and Nixon’s roles in the 1971 Pakistani civil war, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide. The book is summarized in an excellent book review in last Sunday’s Times (by Dexter Filkins) and in an op-ed by Bass himself later in the week. A quick taste of its revelations:

Nixon and Kissinger were not just motivated by dispassionate realpolitik, weighing Pakistan’s help with the secret opening to China or India’s pro-Soviet leanings. The White House tapes capture their emotional rage, going far beyond Nixon’s habitual vulgarity. In the Oval Office, Nixon told Kissinger that the Indians needed “a mass famine.” Kissinger sneered at people who “bleed” for “the dying Bengalis.”

Anyone who knows the relevant history will find himself experiencing vertigo and nausea at what Bass has discovered. Just read it, and ask yourself how moral trash of this caliber ever got elected, managed to govern us, and stay within the good graces of our political culture.

Speaking of buckets, I hope you have one nearby. If you’ve made it this far, you probably need one. I know I do.

Irfan

P.S. A palette cleanser, care of Van Halen.

Egoism and the right to health care

English: Barack Obama signing the Patient Prot...

English: Barack Obama signing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at the White House (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Recent events have put Obamacare at the front and center of American political consciousness–and in doing so, focused attention directly on the right to health care. Objectivists and libertarians are deeply frustrated at the acquiescience with which Americans have greeted both things–Obamacare and the right to health care. But I think this frustration conceals something from view that Objectivists in particular have failed to grasp, and need to grapple with. Americans’ acquiescence in Obamacare, and the right to health care, is explainable in large part by an unresolved tension within Objectivism itself. I don’t mean that this tension is unresolvable or inevitable. I simply mean that it’s there. Until it’s resolved, we should all brace for frustration and political failure.

Objectivism endorses all four of the following propositions:

(1) All moral agents ought (qua moral) to act in their rational self-interest.

(2) There are no conflicts of interest among rational agents acting rationally.

(3) Rights have to be understood in such a way as to allow us, in emergencies, to take actions that would be rights-violative in non-emergencies.

(4) There is no positive right to health care, i.e., no right to be provided health care by unconsenting others.

I suppose one could quarrel or quibble with whether or not Objectivism endorses this or that claim, but I think it’s clear that it endorses all four.

Suppose that I endorse (1) and (2). Then my adoption of (4) must be conditioned on my justified belief that (1), (2), and (4) are consistent. Put another way: in endorsing (1) and (2), I must be justified in my belief that the rejection of a positive right to health care is compatible not only with my pursuing my self-interest, but with anyone’s pursuing his or her self-interest at the same time. Suppose now that I am either extremely ill, or suffer a significant injury, or rationally fear the high probability of either becoming extremely ill or suffering a significant injury. I must then be justified in believing that my adoption of (4) is compatible with my medical condition and/or my fear of such a condition. I must justifiedly believe that, all things considered, I benefit by foregoing a right to be provided with precisely that health care that would relieve my illness, my injury, or my justified fear of both.

If, for example, I have cancer, then if I endorse (1) and (2), it must be demonstrable that in adopting (4), I promote my interests. There must be some benefit, such that, even if I have cancer, my rejection of the right to be provided with cancer treatment is in my interests, whereas my adoption of such a right is not. I must somehow benefit via the willingness to forego this “right” and lose out by the willingness to adopt it. This must be the case even if, in my case, the willingness to adopt the right might make it more likely that I receive cancer treatment (and live to old age), and the willingness to forego might make it more likely that I don’t (and die prematurely). And so on, across the entire breadth of illnesses, injuries, and rationally-justified fears. (I don’t mean that the person in question must actually be persuaded by the demonstration, but that the demonstration must succeed as a rational justification of the relevant claims.)

Suppose, once again, that I have cancer. Suppose that I endorse (1) and (2), but find (4) implausible. So I reject (4) in the name of (3): I have a right to health care (I tell myself) because my medical situation is an emergency. While there is, generally speaking, no right to health care–this reasoning goes–there is one in cases of life or death, i.e., where the failure to be provided with assistance would lead (in a relatively direct causal way) to premature death.

One problem here is that the parenthetical in the last sentence is vague. A second problem is that the conception of  “emergency” just invoked isn’t the one Rand defended in “The Ethics of Emergencies”; her definition is much narrower, and explicitly excludes things like illness. So if the reasoning of the preceding paragraph is right, Rand’s definition of an emergency is wrong; whereas if Rand’s definition is right, then (4) cannot be rejected or modified in the name of (3). One or the other thing (or some third thing) must be the case. Either we adopt Rand’s definition of emergency, and foreclose the idea of justifying a right to health care in cases that fall outside of that definition; or we broaden the definition, and justify a narrow right to health care in cases that fall within the broadened definition; or some other option. But the stated options are exclusive.

What Objectivism needs is a full, comprehensive resolution of the apparent tension between (1)-(4). We need an account, for cases like serious medical conditions, of how it is that the rejection of a positive right to the resolution of the condition promotes the agent’s interests, whereas acceptance of such a right does not promote them.

My point is not to claim that such an account is impossible, or even implausible, but to insist that it does not yet exist. I’ve read the entirety of the existing Objectivist literature on the subject. Even the best effort on the subject–David Kelley‘s A Life of One’s Own–falls short of doing what needs to be done. (This is not to criticize the book at all, but simply to observe that it doesn’t deal with the issue I’ve described here.) If I’m right about that, no Objectivist can be justified in insisting on (4) while abstracting from its relation to (1)-(3). On the Objectivist view, insistence on (4) presupposes an adequate defense of (1)-(3).

I don’t think there is such a defense right now. That is the basic problem I have with almost all Objectivist polemics on this subject. Such polemics begin in midstream, insisting on derivative political claims while leaving the fundamental ethical ones basically undiscussed and undefended. That, it seems to me, is what explains the peculiar hysteria that seems expressed in such polemics. The more loudly its exponents insist on their claims, the more they seem to become conscious of the tension within them–and on the need to downplay that tension in the heat of argument. But that is not a sustainable strategy for political success. It’s a recipe for self-marginalization, and ultimately, self-deception.

My practical suggestion to Objectivists would be to redirect their effort and resources away from celebrations of the government shut-down (and outrage over Obamacare) and toward offering a more defensible version of the Objectivist argument with respect to (1)-(4). Virtually every political frustration we face can be traced, in some way, to our failure to do that.

Feel free to resent the coercion in Obamacare, to criticize it, and to resist it. But ask yourself all the while how much is gained by an approach to politics that demands on the one hand that we insist on egoism, and then seems to turn around and demand what look and sound like acts of self-sacrifice in the name of liberty. If we have nothing to say in answer to the question, “What’s in it for me?” we have no way of winning any argument on our own terms. It is one thing to say that a cancer patient gains by foregoing a right to health care. It is another thing entirely to say that a cancer patient’s self-interest doesn’t matter because liberty matters more. If we cannot get this distinction right, we cannot get politics right. What absolutely cannot be done is to blur the two options into one indiscernible polemical blob.

Honesty should tell us that we lack an account reconciling the Objectivist conception of egoism with the Objectivist conception of liberty. Justice tells us that we owe such an account to our interlocutors regardless of their state of physical health. Pride should dissuade us from settling for a less ambitious approach to politics. Productiveness should get us started on the job.

Irfan

(Thanks to Kate Herrick and Michael Young for valuable discussion on this topic. Neither Kate nor Michael should necessarily be taken to agree with anything I’ve written here.)

Never underestimate your allies

I thought it was the right-wing that was the faith-based community:

To the Editor:

It all comes down to trust. After a career in law enforcement, and sick to death of our paralyzed Congress and the feckless United Nations, I am anything but naïve. But hearing President Obama speak about the Syrian situation, I trust him to do what is best.

MacKENZIE ALLEN
Santa Fe, N.M., Sept. 11, 2013

I thought it was Operation Rescue that relied on naked appeals to the emotions to make its arguments:

After a muddled start in his lurch toward military action in Syria, President Obama did better in his speech on Tuesday night. He offered a forceful moral argument for a limited strike against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad for the use of chemical weapons on Aug. 21.

“The images from this massacre are sickening: Men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison gas,” Mr. Obama said. “Others foaming at the mouth, gasping for breath. A father clutching his dead children, imploring them to get up and walk. On that terrible night, the world saw in gruesome detail the terrible nature of chemical weapons, and why the overwhelming majority of humanity has declared them off limits — a crime against humanity, and a violation of the laws of war.”

But the speech lacked any real sense of what Mr. Obama’s long-term or even medium-term strategy might be, other than his repeated promise not to drag a nation fed up with wars into a “boots-on-the-ground” fight.

I thought it was the neo-conservatives who were the reckless and cavalier advocates of war whose consequences they hadn’t thought through:

In short, the mere flexing of military power worked — initially and tentatively. And while it seems that neither Congress nor the public has any appetite for cruise missile strikes on Syria, it will be critical to keep the military option alive in the coming weeks or Russia and Syria will play us like a yo-yo.

Frankly, I’m skeptical that a deal can be worked out in which Syria hands over its chemical weaponry, and President Obama may have exchanged a losing struggle with Congress with a Sisyphean struggle with Russia. But it’s not impossible.

I thought it was the Objectivists who were in favor of a war against Iran that would kill untold numbers of people but whose far-fetched and rationalistic justification makes no sense:

First, we must declare war on Iran and take out the current regime. This does not require bombing everything or killing everyone in Iran. Far from it. Many Iranians are good people who want to be freed from the theocracy; thus, the war should be waged not on the general population, but specifically on the assets and people who directly support the existing regime. A proper campaign would target all known Iranian military assets, government buildings, mosques, madrasahs (colleges in which students are trained to be jihadists), and the residences of the regime’s leaders, imams, clerics, and officials.

Wait. It is the Objectivists who are in favor of a war against Iran that would kill untold numbers of people but whose far-fetched and rationalistic justification makes no sense.

Irfan

The liberals implode

This video is a scream, in more ways than one (care of Roderick’s Austro-Athenian blog). Screamingly hilarious but also kind of tellingly sad to watch the liberals falling all over themselves to stand by their man, Obama, and give him whatever he wants.

There’s parody, and then there’s unintentional self-parody. Here’s a letter from Thursday’s New York Times. The “issue” in question is Syria.

To the Editor:

Those critical of President Obama on this issue owe us an explanation of how to lead when much of the electorate and the international community want contradictory things.

No more American involvement in Middle East wars but no more passive complicity in genocide. Contain weapons of mass destruction but only by peaceful means. Act decisively but only with the consent of Congress and the international community. Honor the Constitution but with the daring of Superman unbound.

Critics should tell the president what action he could take that addresses all the variables in this complex problem and how to get the necessary cooperation from obstinate parties, or just keep quiet.

GEORGE HARRIS
Williamsburg, Va., Sept. 11, 2013

In other words, in order to oppose a war that no one has bothered to justify, we’re obliged to attempt the impossible. If we don’t succeed at the impossible, we must either support the President and go to war–or shut up.

Two obvious points:

1. No single person that I know of or have heard of has simultaneously asserted all of the claims that Harris mentions in his letter. So there is no particular individual to charge with the inconsistency or incoherence Harris has in mind. If there were such a person, he or she would simply be a fool irrelevant to discourse and irrelevant to the debate about Syria. So on this interpretation, what we have is a classic straw man argument.

2. If you assume the existence of free speech, and then insist on affirming or acting on or accommodating all of the beliefs you find expressed under conditions of freedom, you will–believe it or not–inevitably end up entangled in inconsistent beliefs. An analogous procedure would be to stand before a classroom, canvass the opinions in the class on a given subject, and then insist that every contributor to the conversation take stock of every claim made by all of his predecessors in the conversation, incorporating all of them into every claim he himself makes, while keeping his own beliefs in reflective equilibrium. “If you can’t do that, don’t raise your hand.”

Student: Well, as Jill said and as Joe said and as Bob said and as Sarah said….uh, wait, what was my point, again?

Right–it’s impossible. The whole point of leadership (or epistemic responsibility) is to exercise the capacity to choose between inconsistent options (or formulate them so that they make sense), not to declare oneself indignantly helpless upon discovering the obvious fact that when you artificially aggregate individually-expressed beliefs, they don’t cohere. So on this interpretation, we have a classic straw man argument as well.

Instead of stamping one’s feet at the inconsistencies one has discovered in the electorate, why not demand that the Obama Administration come up with a coherent account of the options it favors on either side of Harris’s supposed antinomies? (Uh, really not that hard to solve, by the way.) The electorate may want contradictory things; it doesn’t follow that Obama is a passive conduit for contradictory wants. Evidently, we’re to conceive of the most powerful man in the world as bound by our wants like some hapless Prometheus, and then use this delusion as a means of self-paralysis as we follow him into war. And I used to think that the Republicans were mindless authoritarians.

So, if you insist that I engage Harris’s problem on its own terms: the action that “addresses all the variables in the complex problem” turns out to be an omission or two–don’t go to war, and stop drawing “red lines.” (Preferably: just stop talking so much.) If you really want to do something, open our borders to Syrian refugees. For sixty-plus years now, we’ve been hearing post-Holocaust rhetoric about how we must learn from the Holocaust and “never, ever let it happen again.” Well, what we “let happen” that time around was not to let the Jews into the United States when they were being slaughtered in Eastern Europe. If you don’t want “it to happen again,” try learning that lesson this time and applying it, mutatis mutandis, to the Syrians. And then, try leaving it at that for a change. You’ll find, I think, that it’s quite enough to pull off in any successful way. Really.

George Harris, by the way, is an eminent philosopher at William and Mary, the author of Agent-Centered Morality, a defense of Aristotelian ethics. Great book. Ridiculous letter. Sorry. Really no other way to put it.

Irfan

9/11: twelve years later

Here’s some material pertinent to 9/11, twelve years later.

As this not-bad article in USA Today suggests, interest in 9/11 is, naturally enough, waning. I’d argue that it’s been waning for at least five years if not more. To some degree, the focus is now less on the event itself than on our reactions to it.

Here’s something I wrote for a symposium at The College of New Jersey in November 2001–“How Not to Explain September 11“–disputing what I call the “grievance explanation” for 9/11. With the exception of the factual mistake noted in footnote 1, I still stand by it twelve years later.

Here’s a related talk I gave in 2011 to the Association for Core Texts and Courses on teaching Osama bin Laden’s “Letter to the Americans.” Coincidentally, the US military assassinated bin Laden about a week after I gave the talk.

This (translated) set of blog posts by Khalil Ahmad of the Alternate Solutions Institute in Lahore, Pakistan discusses the bin Laden assassination from (what I regard as) a very reasonable Pakistani perspective.

A related piece (for which I lack an electronic or online copy) is “‘Why They Hate Us’: A Pedagogical Proposal,” published in 2010, which discusses what’s required to “understand” 9/11. I’m happy to say that I’m in the process of putting a course together here at Felician based on the proposal.

I likewise lack an electronic or online copy of an essay I co-wrote on 9/11 rumors with Gary Alan Fine of Northwestern University, a well-known sociologist of rumor. But you can see a bit of it via Google Books. The essay explains the prevalence of 9/11 rumors by way of Thomas Nagel’s famous question “What is it like to be a bat?” (in this case, of course, the question becomes, “What is it like to be a terrorist?”).

The immediate impetus for the essay was a (false) rumor to the effect that the Arabs of Paterson, New Jersey had celebrated 9/11 en masse. Arguably, a handful of teenagers in Arab South Paterson had gone out onto Main St, and did some exulting directly after 9/11, or something like it. I’ve queried residents and journalists about it for years and have gotten some credible testimony from residents to that effect. But there was no large-scale celebration.

Here’s an interview I did with The Jewish Standard of Teaneck, NJ  in December 2002 on related issues.

Park51 OpenHouse

Park51 OpenHouse (Photo credit: AslanMedia). Do these people deserve to die? Ask Leonard Peikoff.

Finally, in 2010, I wrote a letter to Reason magazine criticizing the anti-Muslim views of the activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Leonard Peikoff. For whatever reason, Reason published the Hirsi Ali part of the letter but omitted the Peikoff part. The Peikoff part of the letter refers to his deranged views on the (misnamed) “Ground Zero Mosque.” Here’s the letter in its uncut form:

To Reason magazine, Nov. 7, 2010.

I very much appreciated Jesse Walker’s critique of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Leonard Peikoff in “Forced to Be Free” (Nov. 2010). But he understates his case against both of them.

Walker takes issue with Ayaan Hirsi Ali for calling for the abolition of Muslim schools in the United States, and then claims that “at least she speaks with direct experience of the ugly side of Islam.” That’s misleading. I don’t dispute that Hirsi Ali’s life experiences have been horrific, but the fact is, she has almost zero first-hand experience of Muslim life in the U.S., as distinct from Muslim life in East Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Holland. That lack of experience has not prevented her from offering extravagant generalizations about the nature of Muslim-American mosques, schools, and families, a contradiction lost both on Hirsi Ali and her defenders.

As for Leonard Peikoff, Walker quotes Peikoff’s claim that “permission should be refused” for the construction of Park51–the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque”– “and if they go ahead and build it, the government should bomb it out of existence, evacuating it first, with no compensation to any of the property owners involved in this monstrosity.”

It’s worth noting that apart from being immoral, Peikoff’s suggestion is incoherent. Recall that Peikoff regards Park51 as fair game for an attack because he regards the United States as at war with all Muslims as such, regardless of their involvement in terrorism. On his view, Park51 is the equivalent of an Islamist military base in New York City. Contrary to Peikoff, however, it makes no sense to evacuate a military base before bombing it. The target in an attack on a military base is not just the base’s infrastructure but its personnel, with non-combatant civilians regarded as collateral damages. If Park51 is the equivalent of a military base, then the same principle must apply to it. If so, Peikoff cannot consistently demand that the building be bombed after evacuation: he must accept the fact that on his own rationale, if Park51 is to be bombed, every person in it is, for purposes of bombing, either a direct target or a regrettable but justified casualty of any bombing. In other words, he ought more forthrightly to face the fact that stripped of its ad hoc rationalizations, what he’s prescribing in the name of freedom is mass murder. The rest of us ought more forthrightly to face it, too.

Irfan

P.S., 12:17 pm: A quick afterthought to the foregoing. From a certain perspective, the links above seem not to have any real unifying theme; they’re on disparate topics and criticize parties on all sides of various conventional disputes. The motivation that links them is my conviction that–to paraphrase Christopher Hitchens–even when justified, warfare poisons everything. I thought and still think that Bush’s decision to attack Al Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11 was justified. Though I don’t accept the nation-building rationale in Afghanistan or elsewhere, and think we should have left a long time ago, the fact remains that we are there (“we” includes the US and its allies), and vulnerable to attack by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. For that reason, I remain in favor of drone attacks on both. Having said that, even the most justified war creates the dangers of coming to resemble the monsters we’re (justifiably) trying to fight. So if I were to summarize what the links say, it’d be the following:

1. “How Not to Explain 9/11”: Don’t make excuses for Al Qaeda.

2. “Bin Laden’s Letter”: Know the enemy in the strong epistemic sense of “know.”

3. “Letters from Lahore”: Don’t ignore the difficult situation of your allies, but don’t make excuses for them, either.

4. “Why They Hate Us”: Understanding precedes evaluation, so tailor your evaluations even of your enemies to your understanding of them.

5. “Celebrating Arabs”: Rumors are a form of pseudo-knowledge or anti-knowledge. Don’t believe them, and don’t spread them.

6. Jewish Standard interview: Don’t make excuses for racism even if the racists in question are themselves often victims of racism (e.g., Islamic anti-Semitism). (I don’t mean that “Islam” is a race; I mean that Muslims are often victims of racism.)

7. Reason letter: Don’t regard the peaceful citizens of your own country (e.g., Muslim Americans) as the equivalent of your mortal enemies on the basis of stupid stereotypes, over-simplified generalizations, and rhetorical hot air.

Yet more on Syria

To continue with the wall-to-wall Syria coverage here….

In a critique I wrote for Reason Papers of Angelo Codevilla’s No Victory, No Peace (Reason Papers, Spring 2006), I agreed with Codevilla that victory in warfare is an all-or-nothing matter:

Since victory is the natural goal of warfare, the issue we face in warfare is conceptually simple but psychologically demanding. We must first decide whether or not to go to war. If we elect to go to war, victory automatically becomes our goal, and we are obliged both to get clear on what the goal requires of us and then to satisfy its requirements. If we find ourselves unclear about its requirements or unwilling to bring it about, then rationality demands that we abjure war altogether. A war that aims at less than full victory is not worth fighting at all. By contrast, a war that aims at victory can be worth fighting even at colossally high cost—as witness the U.S. Civil War or World War II, paradigm examples of justifiable wars fought by the classical conception of victory. The failure to heed the mutually exclusive options we  face in warfare—to blur the relevant distinctions, gloss over inconvenient facts, or exaggerate or understate the consequences of action or inaction—is the thin wedge of defeat, and in the worst cases, of catastrophe and annihilation. Warfare, like all meaningful human activities, has a logic we ignore at our peril. (p. 9).

Ironically, one of the issues in contention in that symposium was whether or not to attack Syria, which Codevilla favored and Roderick Long and I rejected. (Here is Roderick’s symposium contribution.) For a nice bit of confirmation of the basic logic of my argument–both about victory and about Syria–read Yasin al Haj Saleh’s piece in today’s New York Times. I admire the candor of his piece, but not the guilt-trip behind it. One couldn’t be more explicit than Saleh about the allegedly “humanitarian” demand that we owe the world a duty of altruistic self-sacrifice to the point of being pulled into a war that has nothing to do with our interests. What I particularly admire is Saleh’s explicitness about the idea that we’re obliged not only to fight for Syria but to do so with a view to re-creating the nation itself. Forgotten here is the fact that it was imperialist nation-building that created Syria–and at least remotely or indirectly, the current mess–in the first place.

Angelo Codevilla

Angelo Codevilla (Photo credit: Gage Skidmore)

This letter in the Times commits the left-liberal’s version of a Randroid fallacy about sanction:

To the Editor:

A vote against punishing Syria’s use of poison gas is a vote acquiescing in the killing of innocents with chemical weapons. Where do those who oppose a military strike place the red line: with the annihilation of a city or a nation? The vote in Congress is not about a war in Syria; it is about weapons that can kill thousands.

MICHAEL L. SCHNEIDER
New Haven, Sept. 8, 2013

Put aside the assumption that warfare is a form of retributive justice (and put aside the legitimacy of the concept of retributive justice itself). The basic fallacy here is an equivocation over “acquiescing” (and a related straw man against anti-interventionism). A vote against Syrian intervention is just that: a vote against American military involvement in the Syrian civil war. It only “acquiesces” in “the killing of innocents with chemical weapons” in the sense that it prevents the U.S. military from engaging in further involvement in Syria in order to respond to that killing. It doesn’t “acquiesce” in the sense of condoning the act. We have no free-standing duty to intervene around the world whenever atrocities take place, and we don’t morally speaking “acquiesce” in atrocities simply because we choose not to intervene in them, at least militarily.

To answer Mr Schneider’s question: we place the “red line” at the rights of the denizens of the United States. (Not necessarily its citizens, but its inhabitants, whether full citizens or not. If Puerto Rico were attacked tomorrow, we would be obliged to defend it. And if we made alliances whose ultimate purpose was the defense of the rights of Americans so defined, we’d be obliged to honor those.) Resort to war by the United States requires an attack on or credible threat against the denizens of the United States. That’s what the “common defense” in the Constitution’s Preamble means. Otherwise, all bets are off. And even there, the threshold for war is high. But we don’t go to war where no attack or credible threat against us is involved. And none is in the case of Syria.

Irfan

Syria: gallows humor edition

When I taught at the City University of New York a few years ago, it was an open secret that the institution’s attitude toward its own rules and regulations was inconsistent to the point of open contradiction and brazen hypocrisy. I try not to read internal college emails if I can, but the most memorable such email I ever got was written by a colleague of mine who, fed up with the inconsistencies and nonsensicality of internal CUNY politics, described the institution as an “ad hocracy”–a term that I think should have been included in Aristotle’s list of deviant constitutions in the Politics, and should be a part of our everyday political lexicon.

If you want to see what ad hocracy looks like on a larger scale–where the stakes are a matter of life and death–read today’s lead story in The New York Times on the Obama Administration’s Syria policy, “Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict.” I don’t think I could have invented half of the stuff in it if I’d wanted to confect criticisms of the current drift of “our Syria policy.” My personal favorite passage:

Disputes about whether and when a president or nation may launch an act of war can be hazy because courts generally do not issue definitive answers about such matters. Instead presidents, and countries, create precedents that over time can become generally accepted as a gloss on what written domestic laws and international treaties permit. Against that backdrop, many legal scholars say Mr. Obama is proposing to violate international law. But others contend that the question is ambiguous, and some suggest that the United States could establish a precedent creating new international law if it strikes.

A question for the philosophers of law, particularly those who specialize in international law: can the rule of law consist of rules that are vague to the point of “haze,” and so unpredictable that even their putative authors don’t know what they are, because they’re making them up as they go along? A complex question, to be sure, but one that puts a new spin on the old Aristotelian problem of future contingents: if you thought it was hard to figure out whether or not there’ll be a sea battle tomorrow, try and figure out whether there’ll be a missile strike in Syria this week. Metaphysical gallows humor.

Syria in the present tense.

Syria in the present tense.

Speaking of gallows humor, I was cleaning out some things today, and happened on my old college Arabic textbook, Ziadeh and Winder’s An Introduction to Modern Arabic, published in 1957. The illustrative text from chapter 27, on Syria, has either a quaint or sardonic quality to it at this point–I’m not sure which. The student is asked to study an Arabic passage that parallels the following English text:

The traveller from Beirut to Damascus passes by several summer-resort villages spread out on both side of the road in the mountains. When he reaches Zahr al-Baydar, and begins to look to the east, he sees the fertile plain of al-Biqa’ stretching from north to south. In front of him the town of Shuturah appears with its beautiful gardens. From a distance looms the head of a white mountain–Mount Hermon. When the traveller resumes his journeying beyond that town in the anti-Lebanon mountains, he almost thinks himself in the desert because of the extreme dryness. But when he draws near the city of Damascus, he finds the trees, orchards, and gardens which the Barada river waters: his soul is rested because of them. Then he sees a broad street which leads to the heart of the city, next to the river.

Call it an elegy for a country in grammar-book form. It’s from the chapter on “Weak Verbs in the Imperfect.” Present tense.

Irfan

Congressman Frelinghuysen responds

I just got the following email from Congressman Frelinghuysen responding to the letter I described in the preceding blog post. In some ways, the letter shows how “overlapping consensus” in politics can almost be as dispiriting as flat-out disagreement,  but I’m gratified at least that Rep. Frelinghuysen and I agree on the immediate issue of Syrian intervention. Next stop: Senator Menendez.

Dear Friend:

Thank you for contacting me in opposition to the President’s proposed military strike on Syria.  I appreciate having the benefit of your views as I share them.

We have seen over one hundred thousand deaths in Syria, millions of Syrian refugees fleeing to neighboring countries and an influx of various terrorist groups, and only now has the President of the United States decided to take military action as the result of the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime.  

 

While I am horrified by the deaths of so many innocent men, women and children, I do not believe that the President’s plans will change the course of this civil war!  I cannot support his request.

 

In a larger context, Congress cannot ignore that a clear lack of Presidential leadership has left our Middle East policies in shambles. This Administration has virtually destroyed a 30-year friendship with Egypt, allowed Iran to continue its march to a nuclear weapons capability, threatened the stability of Jordan, an ally, and left our best friend in the region, Israel, incredibly vulnerable!

Irfan

Syria: a letter to Rep. Frelinghuysen

, U.S. Congressman.

Rodney Frelinghuysen, U.S. Congressman. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

So far, I’ve only managed to write one letter to my political representatives in rejection of intervention in Syria. That’s unfortunate, because my senator, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), has been one of the most gung-ho supporters of missile strikes in Congress, and I haven’t yet written to him. (I’ve written to him before; his foreign policies views are a mess, and his responses back to me have invariably been of the vacuous pro forma variety.) The one letter I managed to get off was to my Congressman, Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), who appears to be on the fence about intervention. Here’s the text of the letter:

Dear Representative Frelinghuysen:

I’m writing to express my absolute rejection of the idea of intervention in Syria. In fact, the intervention has already begun in advance of the president’s desire for missile strikes. And yet so far, not only has the administration not successfully explained why intervention is in our national interest, it doesn’t even seem focused on that issue. The claims it has made on the subject are vague to the point of vacuity. Can we really afford to get embroiled in a war on this basis? It seems imperative in this light that our political representatives vote “no”–an emphatic “no”–on the proposed (further) Syrian intervention.

I write a blog, and I’ve been blogging against Syrian intervention for months: https://instituteforobjectiviststudies.wordpress.com/?s=syria&submit= Please don’t hesitate to contact me for further elaboration.

I’m not particularly satisfied with the way it reads; I dashed it off somewhat hastily in one take on the “Contact” section of Frelinghuysen’s website. I’m a slow writer, and I have an unrealistic tendency to send my political representatives long, over-explanatory letters that I doubt they read, much less comprehend. But this is no time for that: the decision on Syria is imminent, and I basically just wanted Frelinghuysen to know that I stood against intervention. I’ll post his response here when I get it.

In the meantime, one’s heart sinks at the pathetic character of the supposed Congressional “opposition” to intervention, especially on the Democratic side of the aisle. Consider the priorities of this “opposition,” and its approach to political decision-making about matters of life and death:

“There are two major considerations to take into account,” said Representative Hakeem Jeffries, a freshman from New York and member of the Black Caucus. “The prestige of an administration we strongly support versus an open-ended conflict in the Middle East that risks the lives of the people we represent if war were to break out. Not to mention the diversion of resources back into our communities that sorely need it.”

I don’t know what’s worse: that Jeffries’s claim about “prestige” is racially motivated or that it’s motivated by partisan considerations. I almost find it difficult to credit the existence of a mentality that can think this way–a mentality that thinks that prestige is a normative consideration on all fours with “the lives of the people we represent if war were to break out.” What “prestige” can a regime have if its leadership thinks this way? And this is the opposition to the war!

Consider what Jeffries is saying.

Racial interpretation: I am black. The president is black. “Therefore,” the president’s prestige matters a great deal to me; after all, we’re members of the same race. Racial solidarity is a normative consideration I regard as on par with whether or not the risks of war are high or low. Which is it to take precedence: racial solidarity or the lives of the people I represent? I’m not sure, but I’d prima facie be willing to sacrifice lives for the sake of racial solidarity.

Partisan interpretation: I am a Democrat. The president is a Democrat. “Therefore,” the president’s prestige matters a great deal to me: after all, we’re members of the same party. Partisan solidarity is a normative consideration I regard as on par with whether or not the risks of war are high or low. Which is to take precedence: partisan solidarity, or the lives of the people Irepresent? I’m not sure, but I’d prima facie be willing to sacrifice lives for the sake of partisan solidarity.

Arguably, Jeffries’s claim about prestige is a matter of both racial and partisan considerations. Just start either of the preceding paragraphs with: “I am a black Democrat. The president is a black Democrat….” And you can fill in the rest. He’d be willing to sacrifice lives for the sake of racialized partisan solidarity.

We’re dealing here with a political class–to paraphrase Nietzsche–whose “therefores” are self-refutations. It almost seems an exercise in futility trying to reason with these people. But if there’s the possibility of success–the possibility of influencing the outcome of the impending vote–we really don’t have a choice.

Irfan

Syria: the revisionism “begins”

You may be under the impression that we’re currently having a debate in the U.S. to figure out whether or not to intervene in Syria. Of course, missile strikes or not, that decision was made long ago, without fanfare or debate. We’ve been backing the Syrian rebels for some time now:

The White House’s aggressive push for Congressional approval of an attack on Syria appeared to have won the tentative support of one of President Obama’s most hawkish critics, Senator John McCain, who said Monday that he would back a limited strike if the president did more to arm the Syrian rebels and the attack was punishing enough to weaken the Syrian military.

In an hourlong meeting at the White House, said Mr. McCain, Republican of Arizona, Mr. Obama gave general support to doing more for the Syrian rebels, although no specifics were agreed upon. Officials said that in the same conversation, which included Senator Lindsey Graham, the South Carolina Republican, Mr. Obama indicated that a covert effort by the United States to arm and train Syrian rebels was beginning to yield results: the first 50-man cell of fighters, who have been trained by the C.I.A., was beginning to sneak into Syria.

So the “debate about intervention” we are having is no longer a debate “about intervention” but a debate about the type and degree of intervention we’re to have, given the prior and undisputed fact of intervention. Since we’ve already intervened, we’re being manipulated to accept further intervention as a fait accompli along with the path dependencies it involves: now that we’ve gone this far done the road (the implication is), we may as well do what it takes to “get the job done.”  And already the only parties to the debate being appeased are those who want to go farther than the president.

This piece in Spiked takes the point further (ht: Mark Brady).

What we have here, then, is a case study in the structure of a regulatory/interventionist state out of control: sail the seven seas looking for problems that are not the government’s to solve; intervene in them without discussion; then discuss whether or not to increase the size and scope of intervention, given that “failure is not an option.”

They say that truth is the first casualty of war. Here’s one of the first historiographical casualties, care of a former Bush official:

Two potential Republican presidential candidates in 2016, Gov. Chris Christie of New Jersey and Gov. Scott Walker of Wisconsin, both expressed concern at a governors’ forum in July about the rising strength of national security libertarianism among Republicans, but they have so far kept quiet about Syria.

There will be many more votes and debates between the Syria resolution and the 2016 primaries. And the hawks note that although Mr. Obama defeated Hillary Rodham Clinton in 2008 in part because of her support for the Iraq war resolution, another Democratic presidential nominee, Mr. Kerry in 2004, fended off a liberal threat in a more dovish party even though he backed the same measure.

“Isolationist tendencies don’t do well in American politics over the long run,” Mr. Senor said.

Isolationist tendencies dominated American politics between the first and second World Wars–from 1918 to 1941, i.e., for more than twenty years. If the twenty years between the wars is not the “long run,” then presumably twenty years from now is not the “long run,” either. In that case, we should be able to ask the question, “What is our current Syria policy for the year 2033?” and get a straight answer–rather than the predictable answer that no one has a “crystal ball” and that 2033 is too far in the future to permit detailed planning. So what is our Syria policy for the year 2033?

The advocates of this war keep telling us that some “catastrophe” will befall us if we don’t throw ourselves into it. I can think of many catastrophes that may befall us if we do throw ourselves into it, but what exactly is the catastrophe they have in mind if we sit on the sidelines?

Mr. McCain has long advocated intervention in Syria’s civil war. After meeting with President Obama at the White House on Monday, he said that it would be “catastrophic” if Congress did not approve the president’s proposal and that such a rejection would result in the United States’s credibility being “shredded.”

I find it hard to credit the idea that we are being asked to fight a war over the impending catastrophe of a “loss of credibility.” But accept it ex hypothesi. Suppose our failure to go to war results in a “loss of credibility.” Then what? What happens if we “lose credibility”? Is the resulting state of affairs really worth fighting a war to avoid? No one should invoke this “credibility” gambit without having a clear answer to that question.

A country that fights wars to maintain its credibility obviously doesn’t have any to maintain, and can’t acquire any by pretending to have a debate over intervention after the intervention has begun. The debate itself lacks credibility in the eyes of those participating in it. Why think that missile strikes would purchase that golden commodity, credibility, when there is no credible reason to think that missile strikes by themselves will significantly alter the outcome of the war?

Our opinion makers keep talking about “war weariness” and “fatigue.” A piece of advice for them: don’t mistake resistance to this war with lack of energy or a waning of resolve.

In my case, at least, resistance is not a matter of “weariness” or “fatigue” but just the reverse. Having lived through the tail-end of Vietnam, along with Lebanon, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya–the entire sick, sad litany of U.S. foreign adventures, some of which began plausibly enough, others of which didn’t–it has at last (at long last, I suppose) dawned on me that there is no end to the warfare our leaders have in mind for us. The talk of justifications and just war theory is ultimately beside the point here, an academic exercise in the worst sense of the term. There are in fact no principles at work here, no intelligible goals, no limits, no horizon that bounds their desire for more. There is just our leaders’ bipartisan addiction to warfare, their belief that every problem on Earth is ours to solve, and every weapon in our arsenal is ours to use in the effectuation of the pseudo-solutions they dream up.

It can only end when, to borrow a line from Atlas Shrugged, we each–every one of us, every day–rise up and say: “I will put an end to this.” Until it ends.

Irfan