Home » Posts tagged 'United States'
Tag Archives: United States
A taste of evil
If you go into an ice cream parlor these days, you’re apt to be offered a free sample. You walk in, and some cheery college student (who really ought to be reading a book or doing problem sets or something) says, “Would you like to sample our new chocolate cream mousse pistachio mint mango raspberry radicchio flavor? It’s free!” After wondering a bit what language you’ve just heard, you say OK, helping yourself to a tiny sample of what’s on offer, and steeling yourself to leave it at that, for God’s sake. Within minutes, of course, you find yourself buying and consuming a gallon of ice cream on the spot, and resolving never to walk into this den of iniquity again–at least until tomorrow.
Anyway–long preface I know–but this post is a free sample of evil, gleaned from a few days’ reading of my fave newspaper, The New York Times. The aim here is not to induce you to swallow any more evil, but to spit out (or throw up) whatever portion you may unwittingly have taken in and digested. In addition, I hope to induce you to reflect on the banality of evil, which exhibits itself throughout. (I had to throw that last part in, because no discussion of evil is allowed to take place in this post-Arendtian age unless allusion is made to “the banality of evil,” despite the fact that no one–including Hannah Arendt–has ever known what “the banality of evil” is supposed to mean.)
(1) Sample 1: housing regulation cobbler
America’s left-wingers are very angry nowadays at its right-wingers. That’s because the left is convinced that regulation will save us from the evils of selfishness and greed, and their baneful effects, poverty and inequality. Meanwhile, the right is generally anti-regulatory in economic matters, which seems to imply to many people that it is in favor of selfishness, greed, poverty, and inequality.
All this brings us to the strange case of the housing market. An editorial in The New York Times this week defends the New Jersey Supreme Court’s re-affirmation of the Mt. Laurel housing decision on the grounds that Mt. Laurel rectifies exclusionary zoning, a barrier to entry into the market.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has wisely rejected an attempt by Gov. Chris Christie to undermine its 30-year-old-ruling in the Mount Laurel fair housing case, one of the more important civil rights decisions of the modern era. In last week’s strongly worded decision, the court made clear that it would be keeping a close eye on both the Christie administration and wealthy communities that might be inclined to flout the law, which limits the use of exclusionary zoning as a means of preventing the construction of affordable housing.
I agree with Mt. Laurel, at least as a stop-gap remedy for exclusionary zoning, which seems to me much worse in its effects than the inclusionary zoning that Mt. Laurel demands. It seems to have escaped the Times’s notice, however, that zoning is not exactly a right-wing idea, and that the “wealthy communities” in question are not exactly right-wing enclaves, either. It also seems to have escaped notice that “limiting the use of exclusionary zoning” is a form of de-regulation that permits the construction of affordable housing that zoning and other regulations inhibit. In my experience, this last thought tends to be too much for the average New Jersey liberal to process; in lieu of processing it, we’re obliged to go back to execration of the conspicuously overweight Chris Christie, using his excessive weight as a metaphor for the gluttony of the market, Republicans, developers, and other stereotypical specimens of human depravity. One day, however, perhaps people will discover that judgments of appearance are really not a reliable proxy for moral judgments, and then come to realize that making fun of Chris Christie’s weight is not in fact a proxy for thinking about the housing market. We can all dream.
Anyway, flip a few pages back in the same day’s edition of the Times, and you can read a great story, “Tenant’s Fine for Renting to Tourist Is Overturned.” Once you get past the banal details of the story, and the totalitarian name of the agency involved (“the Environmental Control Board“), you’ll realize that the real story is this: the City of New York actually has a law on its books that criminalizes the subletting of one’s apartment–regardless of the content of the lease or the permission of one’s landlord–to anyone for even a few days. Many diverse points of view are mentioned in the article, discussing various fine points about “fairness,” but apparently the reporter could find no one to question the “fairness” of the law itself, much less the procedural problematics of a regulatory agency that functions as a de facto police department. (“911, what is your emergency?” –“My quality of life is under attack! A profitable and voluntary exchange is taking place right next to me! I…I can’t move…my apartment is rent-controlled…” –“Hold on, sir; ECB units are en route.”)
So I’ll question it. It’s one thing, and perhaps an unfair thing, that rental leases are often written so as to prevent sub-leasing. But in my experience in New Jersey, one can often get around such explicit prohibitions by means of the commodity known as “persuasion.” Carrie-Ann and I once managed to convince our tough Jersey landlord to allow us to sublet our apartment to someone for six months. He pointed out at first that the lease disallowed subletting, whereupon we responded that he was lord and master of the lease, rather than the other way around, and that it should be his pleasure to dictate terms to the lease rather than let that peasant-like document push him around. Acknowledging this insight with a favorable but wordless gesture, he indicated his acquiescence in our subletting proposal. So reader, we sublet it (the apartment). The anecdote (and frankly, the ease of the negotiation) indicates that even with an unfavorable lease, subletting is at least possible and legal in New Jersey.
Oh, but not in New York. Try it, and whatever your lease says, whatever your landlord says, whatever agreement you manage to make between you, you’ve broken the law, and the fines begin to mount. What if you’re too poor to hire an attorney? Tough luck. What if you get evicted? Tough luck. What if you go broke? Tough luck. What if it was financial problems that induced you to sublease in the first place? Tough luck. Tough luck: thus speak the champions of affordable housing and “environmental control.” I guess people are the main part of the “environment” they’d like to control. A right-wing Republican conspiracy against the poor? Not exactly. Evil? I’d say so.
Here’s my question: how long can the left go on pretending that an a priori default position in favor of, say, existing housing regulations makes coherent sense and benefits the poor? If we can’t assume that the existing structure of property relations benefits the poor, why assume that the existing structure of regulatory relations does? As an Objectivist myself, even I don’t make the first assumption. So I don’t see any reason to acquiesce in a consensus that accepts the second. (Not that the poor are the only people who count, but my point is, they do count.)
If the existing structure of regulations really doesn’t make sense or confer obvious benefits, what exactly is wrong with a zealous commitment to plowing through the statute books and deregulating the housing market, one painstaking step at a time? I know that the very word “deregulation” makes a certain kind of leftist or liberal angry, but I guess I’d like to ask whether leftists and liberals are the only people entitled to a sense of righteous indignation at the way the world works. I’m inclined to think not. It really is not clear to me why the world should be governed by “control boards” whose regulatory powers make no apparent sense. I don’t see that anyone has so far made the reasons transparent.
(2) Sample 2: sexy anorexia (in vanilla)
An article on the same page highlights the great investment we all ought to have in the self-esteem of girls and their need to cultivate a healthy body image. In fact, an article on the Op-Ed page a few weeks ago sounded the same theme. Fair enough. None of us should take pleasure in the exploitation or humiliation of others.
Now turn three pages to the fashion section of the Times, where you get to read–with no sense of irony or consciousness of absurdity–about deathly emaciated models showing off fashions that literally seem fashioned to be devices of torture. I guess you’re supposed to take pleasure in the display, though I’m not sure how anyone could. Take a look.
Our fashion correspondent has a lot of BS to sling at readers about the “endearing” yet “naïve” “idealism” of the scene just above. Right. Actually, I was thinking that I’ve seen impoverished children in the inner city of Lahore who look better nourished than the four women pictured here.
So here’s a thought: maybe the City of New York, in its solicitude for the self-image of “girls,” might begin its crusade with some (purely verbal) criticisms of the Times’s fashion pages, following which the Times can cover the story with a story on itself, followed by some serious editorial tongue self-lashings about its own callous insensitivity as a journalistic institution. I mean surely revenue can’t be the relevant consideration here, can it? I can’t imagine that the Times outdoes Maxim and Playboy in overlooking the obvious exploitation here simply to make a buck. That would certainly call its moral credibility into question. It might even be evil.
(3) Sample 3: rocky road
An article on p. A16 of the same day’s paper details an (alleged) attack by a bunch of motorcyclists on a driver on the Henry Hudson Parkway. The facts are not in, so I am, ex hypothesi, going to treat the facts that have emerged so far as though they were true. They may end up being false, but adjudication of the case as such is not my topic here.
Suppose the facts are as reported, and assume that the victim had a right of self-defense. I assume, then, that he could have exercised that right. How? Well, one obvious way might have been to call the police. But the police weren’t there, and wouldn’t have gotten there on time. Another way was to use his vehicle as a weapon against his attackers. Evidently, that’s what he did, and he hasn’t been charged with any crime for doing so. Inference: using your vehicle to run someone over when you’re under attack by a mob–even someone not directly attacking you–is not obviously a legal predicate for battery. Prima facie, it may well be a case of self-defense, even according to the NYPD.
So here’s a question: what if the victim had had a firearm in his possession? Could he, morally speaking, have turned it on his attackers to defend himself?
My answer is “yes,” but that is not how this reader (in the same day’s letters column) thinks about things. The “you” is the Times’s editorial board, and the “service” is an earlier editorial.
To the Editor:
You have performed a necessary service in emphasizing the unnecessary deaths, injuries and destroyed lives based on our country’s gun culture. I have contributed to several gun control groups, but have come to realize that while they do some good, they are basically ineffective, because their goal is gun control.
Gun control concedes the National Rifle Association’s contention that the Second Amendment gives most Americans an absolute right to own or use guns. This is not true.
I suggest that the phrase “gun control” be replaced with “no guns.” If such a notion were carried out, this would free us of the shame of legalized killings.
ROBERT GELMAN
Ann Arbor, Mich., Sept. 29, 2013
But if “such a notion were carried out,” wouldn’t we also be “freed” of a right of self-defense in cases like the preceding one?
Here, I’d pose a version of the problem I posed in a previous post about health care: how is it in the self-interest of a potential victim of violence to relinquish all rights to possession of firearms? And who isn’t a potential victim of violence?
Either it is in our self-interest, or it isn’t. If it is, how is it? What benefit do all of us get from everyone’s indiscriminately being debarred from acquiring firearms? If it isn’t, why should anyone sacrifice his self-interest (i.e., his right to effective self-defense) for the sake of Robert Gelman’s policy prescriptions? I don’t ask the question because I want to buy a gun (I don’t feel the need for one). I ask the question because I can imagine that someone else might legitimately want to. Apparently, Robert Gelman seems to lack the requisite capacity for moral imagination.
Of course, like so many letters published in the Times, Gelman’s letter equivocates on the key point, and thereby manages to have things all ways at once. Is he against guns as such, or is he against an “absolute” right for anyone to have any gun one wants, whenever one wants, to use it any way one wants, etc.? Read the first way, his letter makes no sense; read the other way, it evades the relevant issue. As for the right to self-defense, one gets the impression from what Gelman says that in the clutch situation, one is to face down one’s attackers armed only with lethal cliches about gun control. But I wonder whether that would actually work against a determined attacker, and somehow doubt that it would.
I wanted to highlight two distinct evils in this section of my post–the people who attacked that motorist on the Henry Hudson, and people like Robert Gelman, who would like to pretend that you can dispose of the idea of a right to firearms by generating hot air about the gun culture and NRA. The first evil is obvious, the second subtler. But a piece of advice for anyone who espouses the second sort of view: try facing someone who wants to kill you with that attitude, and see how far you get.
(4) Sample 4: Nixonian-Kissingerian genocidal swirl
Now that we’re talking about death, I figure I can safely bring up the evilest thing on today’s agenda of evil, namely genocide.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger are not the most popular figures in American politics, but despite the decades-long efforts of the late Christopher Hitchens, Kissinger at least is still regarded as a respectable senior sage on the American scene, and Nixon sometimes gets some passing affection. Put it this way: it’s doubtful that when Kissinger kicks the bucket, his obituaries will come right out and call him a criminal or a madman. And I think few have really pondered the possibility that we were, during the Nixon presidency, governed by a kind of psychopath. But both hypotheses are seriously worth considering.
I haven’t read it, but I’m impressed by descriptions I’ve read of Gary Bass’s new book on Kissinger’s and Nixon’s roles in the 1971 Pakistani civil war, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide. The book is summarized in an excellent book review in last Sunday’s Times (by Dexter Filkins) and in an op-ed by Bass himself later in the week. A quick taste of its revelations:
Nixon and Kissinger were not just motivated by dispassionate realpolitik, weighing Pakistan’s help with the secret opening to China or India’s pro-Soviet leanings. The White House tapes capture their emotional rage, going far beyond Nixon’s habitual vulgarity. In the Oval Office, Nixon told Kissinger that the Indians needed “a mass famine.” Kissinger sneered at people who “bleed” for “the dying Bengalis.”
Anyone who knows the relevant history will find himself experiencing vertigo and nausea at what Bass has discovered. Just read it, and ask yourself how moral trash of this caliber ever got elected, managed to govern us, and stay within the good graces of our political culture.
Speaking of buckets, I hope you have one nearby. If you’ve made it this far, you probably need one. I know I do.
Irfan
Egoism and the right to health care
Recent events have put Obamacare at the front and center of American political consciousness–and in doing so, focused attention directly on the right to health care. Objectivists and libertarians are deeply frustrated at the acquiescience with which Americans have greeted both things–Obamacare and the right to health care. But I think this frustration conceals something from view that Objectivists in particular have failed to grasp, and need to grapple with. Americans’ acquiescence in Obamacare, and the right to health care, is explainable in large part by an unresolved tension within Objectivism itself. I don’t mean that this tension is unresolvable or inevitable. I simply mean that it’s there. Until it’s resolved, we should all brace for frustration and political failure.
Objectivism endorses all four of the following propositions:
(1) All moral agents ought (qua moral) to act in their rational self-interest.
(2) There are no conflicts of interest among rational agents acting rationally.
(3) Rights have to be understood in such a way as to allow us, in emergencies, to take actions that would be rights-violative in non-emergencies.
(4) There is no positive right to health care, i.e., no right to be provided health care by unconsenting others.
I suppose one could quarrel or quibble with whether or not Objectivism endorses this or that claim, but I think it’s clear that it endorses all four.
Suppose that I endorse (1) and (2). Then my adoption of (4) must be conditioned on my justified belief that (1), (2), and (4) are consistent. Put another way: in endorsing (1) and (2), I must be justified in my belief that the rejection of a positive right to health care is compatible not only with my pursuing my self-interest, but with anyone’s pursuing his or her self-interest at the same time. Suppose now that I am either extremely ill, or suffer a significant injury, or rationally fear the high probability of either becoming extremely ill or suffering a significant injury. I must then be justified in believing that my adoption of (4) is compatible with my medical condition and/or my fear of such a condition. I must justifiedly believe that, all things considered, I benefit by foregoing a right to be provided with precisely that health care that would relieve my illness, my injury, or my justified fear of both.
If, for example, I have cancer, then if I endorse (1) and (2), it must be demonstrable that in adopting (4), I promote my interests. There must be some benefit, such that, even if I have cancer, my rejection of the right to be provided with cancer treatment is in my interests, whereas my adoption of such a right is not. I must somehow benefit via the willingness to forego this “right” and lose out by the willingness to adopt it. This must be the case even if, in my case, the willingness to adopt the right might make it more likely that I receive cancer treatment (and live to old age), and the willingness to forego might make it more likely that I don’t (and die prematurely). And so on, across the entire breadth of illnesses, injuries, and rationally-justified fears. (I don’t mean that the person in question must actually be persuaded by the demonstration, but that the demonstration must succeed as a rational justification of the relevant claims.)
Suppose, once again, that I have cancer. Suppose that I endorse (1) and (2), but find (4) implausible. So I reject (4) in the name of (3): I have a right to health care (I tell myself) because my medical situation is an emergency. While there is, generally speaking, no right to health care–this reasoning goes–there is one in cases of life or death, i.e., where the failure to be provided with assistance would lead (in a relatively direct causal way) to premature death.
One problem here is that the parenthetical in the last sentence is vague. A second problem is that the conception of “emergency” just invoked isn’t the one Rand defended in “The Ethics of Emergencies”; her definition is much narrower, and explicitly excludes things like illness. So if the reasoning of the preceding paragraph is right, Rand’s definition of an emergency is wrong; whereas if Rand’s definition is right, then (4) cannot be rejected or modified in the name of (3). One or the other thing (or some third thing) must be the case. Either we adopt Rand’s definition of emergency, and foreclose the idea of justifying a right to health care in cases that fall outside of that definition; or we broaden the definition, and justify a narrow right to health care in cases that fall within the broadened definition; or some other option. But the stated options are exclusive.
What Objectivism needs is a full, comprehensive resolution of the apparent tension between (1)-(4). We need an account, for cases like serious medical conditions, of how it is that the rejection of a positive right to the resolution of the condition promotes the agent’s interests, whereas acceptance of such a right does not promote them.
My point is not to claim that such an account is impossible, or even implausible, but to insist that it does not yet exist. I’ve read the entirety of the existing Objectivist literature on the subject. Even the best effort on the subject–David Kelley‘s A Life of One’s Own–falls short of doing what needs to be done. (This is not to criticize the book at all, but simply to observe that it doesn’t deal with the issue I’ve described here.) If I’m right about that, no Objectivist can be justified in insisting on (4) while abstracting from its relation to (1)-(3). On the Objectivist view, insistence on (4) presupposes an adequate defense of (1)-(3).
I don’t think there is such a defense right now. That is the basic problem I have with almost all Objectivist polemics on this subject. Such polemics begin in midstream, insisting on derivative political claims while leaving the fundamental ethical ones basically undiscussed and undefended. That, it seems to me, is what explains the peculiar hysteria that seems expressed in such polemics. The more loudly its exponents insist on their claims, the more they seem to become conscious of the tension within them–and on the need to downplay that tension in the heat of argument. But that is not a sustainable strategy for political success. It’s a recipe for self-marginalization, and ultimately, self-deception.
My practical suggestion to Objectivists would be to redirect their effort and resources away from celebrations of the government shut-down (and outrage over Obamacare) and toward offering a more defensible version of the Objectivist argument with respect to (1)-(4). Virtually every political frustration we face can be traced, in some way, to our failure to do that.
Feel free to resent the coercion in Obamacare, to criticize it, and to resist it. But ask yourself all the while how much is gained by an approach to politics that demands on the one hand that we insist on egoism, and then seems to turn around and demand what look and sound like acts of self-sacrifice in the name of liberty. If we have nothing to say in answer to the question, “What’s in it for me?” we have no way of winning any argument on our own terms. It is one thing to say that a cancer patient gains by foregoing a right to health care. It is another thing entirely to say that a cancer patient’s self-interest doesn’t matter because liberty matters more. If we cannot get this distinction right, we cannot get politics right. What absolutely cannot be done is to blur the two options into one indiscernible polemical blob.
Honesty should tell us that we lack an account reconciling the Objectivist conception of egoism with the Objectivist conception of liberty. Justice tells us that we owe such an account to our interlocutors regardless of their state of physical health. Pride should dissuade us from settling for a less ambitious approach to politics. Productiveness should get us started on the job.
Irfan
(Thanks to Kate Herrick and Michael Young for valuable discussion on this topic. Neither Kate nor Michael should necessarily be taken to agree with anything I’ve written here.)
9/11: twelve years later
Here’s some material pertinent to 9/11, twelve years later.
As this not-bad article in USA Today suggests, interest in 9/11 is, naturally enough, waning. I’d argue that it’s been waning for at least five years if not more. To some degree, the focus is now less on the event itself than on our reactions to it.
Here’s something I wrote for a symposium at The College of New Jersey in November 2001–“How Not to Explain September 11“–disputing what I call the “grievance explanation” for 9/11. With the exception of the factual mistake noted in footnote 1, I still stand by it twelve years later.
Here’s a related talk I gave in 2011 to the Association for Core Texts and Courses on teaching Osama bin Laden’s “Letter to the Americans.” Coincidentally, the US military assassinated bin Laden about a week after I gave the talk.
This (translated) set of blog posts by Khalil Ahmad of the Alternate Solutions Institute in Lahore, Pakistan discusses the bin Laden assassination from (what I regard as) a very reasonable Pakistani perspective.
A related piece (for which I lack an electronic or online copy) is “‘Why They Hate Us’: A Pedagogical Proposal,” published in 2010, which discusses what’s required to “understand” 9/11. I’m happy to say that I’m in the process of putting a course together here at Felician based on the proposal.
I likewise lack an electronic or online copy of an essay I co-wrote on 9/11 rumors with Gary Alan Fine of Northwestern University, a well-known sociologist of rumor. But you can see a bit of it via Google Books. The essay explains the prevalence of 9/11 rumors by way of Thomas Nagel’s famous question “What is it like to be a bat?” (in this case, of course, the question becomes, “What is it like to be a terrorist?”).
The immediate impetus for the essay was a (false) rumor to the effect that the Arabs of Paterson, New Jersey had celebrated 9/11 en masse. Arguably, a handful of teenagers in Arab South Paterson had gone out onto Main St, and did some exulting directly after 9/11, or something like it. I’ve queried residents and journalists about it for years and have gotten some credible testimony from residents to that effect. But there was no large-scale celebration.
Here’s an interview I did with The Jewish Standard of Teaneck, NJ in December 2002 on related issues.
Finally, in 2010, I wrote a letter to Reason magazine criticizing the anti-Muslim views of the activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Leonard Peikoff. For whatever reason, Reason published the Hirsi Ali part of the letter but omitted the Peikoff part. The Peikoff part of the letter refers to his deranged views on the (misnamed) “Ground Zero Mosque.” Here’s the letter in its uncut form:
To Reason magazine, Nov. 7, 2010.
I very much appreciated Jesse Walker’s critique of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Leonard Peikoff in “Forced to Be Free” (Nov. 2010). But he understates his case against both of them.
Walker takes issue with Ayaan Hirsi Ali for calling for the abolition of Muslim schools in the United States, and then claims that “at least she speaks with direct experience of the ugly side of Islam.” That’s misleading. I don’t dispute that Hirsi Ali’s life experiences have been horrific, but the fact is, she has almost zero first-hand experience of Muslim life in the U.S., as distinct from Muslim life in East Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Holland. That lack of experience has not prevented her from offering extravagant generalizations about the nature of Muslim-American mosques, schools, and families, a contradiction lost both on Hirsi Ali and her defenders.
As for Leonard Peikoff, Walker quotes Peikoff’s claim that “permission should be refused” for the construction of Park51–the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque”– “and if they go ahead and build it, the government should bomb it out of existence, evacuating it first, with no compensation to any of the property owners involved in this monstrosity.”
It’s worth noting that apart from being immoral, Peikoff’s suggestion is incoherent. Recall that Peikoff regards Park51 as fair game for an attack because he regards the United States as at war with all Muslims as such, regardless of their involvement in terrorism. On his view, Park51 is the equivalent of an Islamist military base in New York City. Contrary to Peikoff, however, it makes no sense to evacuate a military base before bombing it. The target in an attack on a military base is not just the base’s infrastructure but its personnel, with non-combatant civilians regarded as collateral damages. If Park51 is the equivalent of a military base, then the same principle must apply to it. If so, Peikoff cannot consistently demand that the building be bombed after evacuation: he must accept the fact that on his own rationale, if Park51 is to be bombed, every person in it is, for purposes of bombing, either a direct target or a regrettable but justified casualty of any bombing. In other words, he ought more forthrightly to face the fact that stripped of its ad hoc rationalizations, what he’s prescribing in the name of freedom is mass murder. The rest of us ought more forthrightly to face it, too.
Irfan
P.S., 12:17 pm: A quick afterthought to the foregoing. From a certain perspective, the links above seem not to have any real unifying theme; they’re on disparate topics and criticize parties on all sides of various conventional disputes. The motivation that links them is my conviction that–to paraphrase Christopher Hitchens–even when justified, warfare poisons everything. I thought and still think that Bush’s decision to attack Al Qaeda and the Taliban after 9/11 was justified. Though I don’t accept the nation-building rationale in Afghanistan or elsewhere, and think we should have left a long time ago, the fact remains that we are there (“we” includes the US and its allies), and vulnerable to attack by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. For that reason, I remain in favor of drone attacks on both. Having said that, even the most justified war creates the dangers of coming to resemble the monsters we’re (justifiably) trying to fight. So if I were to summarize what the links say, it’d be the following:
1. “How Not to Explain 9/11”: Don’t make excuses for Al Qaeda.
2. “Bin Laden’s Letter”: Know the enemy in the strong epistemic sense of “know.”
3. “Letters from Lahore”: Don’t ignore the difficult situation of your allies, but don’t make excuses for them, either.
4. “Why They Hate Us”: Understanding precedes evaluation, so tailor your evaluations even of your enemies to your understanding of them.
5. “Celebrating Arabs”: Rumors are a form of pseudo-knowledge or anti-knowledge. Don’t believe them, and don’t spread them.
6. Jewish Standard interview: Don’t make excuses for racism even if the racists in question are themselves often victims of racism (e.g., Islamic anti-Semitism). (I don’t mean that “Islam” is a race; I mean that Muslims are often victims of racism.)
7. Reason letter: Don’t regard the peaceful citizens of your own country (e.g., Muslim Americans) as the equivalent of your mortal enemies on the basis of stupid stereotypes, over-simplified generalizations, and rhetorical hot air.
Yet more on Syria
To continue with the wall-to-wall Syria coverage here….
In a critique I wrote for Reason Papers of Angelo Codevilla’s No Victory, No Peace (Reason Papers, Spring 2006), I agreed with Codevilla that victory in warfare is an all-or-nothing matter:
Since victory is the natural goal of warfare, the issue we face in warfare is conceptually simple but psychologically demanding. We must first decide whether or not to go to war. If we elect to go to war, victory automatically becomes our goal, and we are obliged both to get clear on what the goal requires of us and then to satisfy its requirements. If we find ourselves unclear about its requirements or unwilling to bring it about, then rationality demands that we abjure war altogether. A war that aims at less than full victory is not worth fighting at all. By contrast, a war that aims at victory can be worth fighting even at colossally high cost—as witness the U.S. Civil War or World War II, paradigm examples of justifiable wars fought by the classical conception of victory. The failure to heed the mutually exclusive options we face in warfare—to blur the relevant distinctions, gloss over inconvenient facts, or exaggerate or understate the consequences of action or inaction—is the thin wedge of defeat, and in the worst cases, of catastrophe and annihilation. Warfare, like all meaningful human activities, has a logic we ignore at our peril. (p. 9).
Ironically, one of the issues in contention in that symposium was whether or not to attack Syria, which Codevilla favored and Roderick Long and I rejected. (Here is Roderick’s symposium contribution.) For a nice bit of confirmation of the basic logic of my argument–both about victory and about Syria–read Yasin al Haj Saleh’s piece in today’s New York Times. I admire the candor of his piece, but not the guilt-trip behind it. One couldn’t be more explicit than Saleh about the allegedly “humanitarian” demand that we owe the world a duty of altruistic self-sacrifice to the point of being pulled into a war that has nothing to do with our interests. What I particularly admire is Saleh’s explicitness about the idea that we’re obliged not only to fight for Syria but to do so with a view to re-creating the nation itself. Forgotten here is the fact that it was imperialist nation-building that created Syria–and at least remotely or indirectly, the current mess–in the first place.
This letter in the Times commits the left-liberal’s version of a Randroid fallacy about sanction:
To the Editor:
A vote against punishing Syria’s use of poison gas is a vote acquiescing in the killing of innocents with chemical weapons. Where do those who oppose a military strike place the red line: with the annihilation of a city or a nation? The vote in Congress is not about a war in Syria; it is about weapons that can kill thousands.
MICHAEL L. SCHNEIDER
New Haven, Sept. 8, 2013
Put aside the assumption that warfare is a form of retributive justice (and put aside the legitimacy of the concept of retributive justice itself). The basic fallacy here is an equivocation over “acquiescing” (and a related straw man against anti-interventionism). A vote against Syrian intervention is just that: a vote against American military involvement in the Syrian civil war. It only “acquiesces” in “the killing of innocents with chemical weapons” in the sense that it prevents the U.S. military from engaging in further involvement in Syria in order to respond to that killing. It doesn’t “acquiesce” in the sense of condoning the act. We have no free-standing duty to intervene around the world whenever atrocities take place, and we don’t morally speaking “acquiesce” in atrocities simply because we choose not to intervene in them, at least militarily.
To answer Mr Schneider’s question: we place the “red line” at the rights of the denizens of the United States. (Not necessarily its citizens, but its inhabitants, whether full citizens or not. If Puerto Rico were attacked tomorrow, we would be obliged to defend it. And if we made alliances whose ultimate purpose was the defense of the rights of Americans so defined, we’d be obliged to honor those.) Resort to war by the United States requires an attack on or credible threat against the denizens of the United States. That’s what the “common defense” in the Constitution’s Preamble means. Otherwise, all bets are off. And even there, the threshold for war is high. But we don’t go to war where no attack or credible threat against us is involved. And none is in the case of Syria.
Irfan
Congressman Frelinghuysen responds
I just got the following email from Congressman Frelinghuysen responding to the letter I described in the preceding blog post. In some ways, the letter shows how “overlapping consensus” in politics can almost be as dispiriting as flat-out disagreement, but I’m gratified at least that Rep. Frelinghuysen and I agree on the immediate issue of Syrian intervention. Next stop: Senator Menendez.
Dear Friend:
Thank you for contacting me in opposition to the President’s proposed military strike on Syria. I appreciate having the benefit of your views as I share them.
We have seen over one hundred thousand deaths in Syria, millions of Syrian refugees fleeing to neighboring countries and an influx of various terrorist groups, and only now has the President of the United States decided to take military action as the result of the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime.
While I am horrified by the deaths of so many innocent men, women and children, I do not believe that the President’s plans will change the course of this civil war! I cannot support his request.
In a larger context, Congress cannot ignore that a clear lack of Presidential leadership has left our Middle East policies in shambles. This Administration has virtually destroyed a 30-year friendship with Egypt, allowed Iran to continue its march to a nuclear weapons capability, threatened the stability of Jordan, an ally, and left our best friend in the region, Israel, incredibly vulnerable!
Irfan
Syria: a letter to Rep. Frelinghuysen
So far, I’ve only managed to write one letter to my political representatives in rejection of intervention in Syria. That’s unfortunate, because my senator, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), has been one of the most gung-ho supporters of missile strikes in Congress, and I haven’t yet written to him. (I’ve written to him before; his foreign policies views are a mess, and his responses back to me have invariably been of the vacuous pro forma variety.) The one letter I managed to get off was to my Congressman, Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), who appears to be on the fence about intervention. Here’s the text of the letter:
Dear Representative Frelinghuysen:
I’m writing to express my absolute rejection of the idea of intervention in Syria. In fact, the intervention has already begun in advance of the president’s desire for missile strikes. And yet so far, not only has the administration not successfully explained why intervention is in our national interest, it doesn’t even seem focused on that issue. The claims it has made on the subject are vague to the point of vacuity. Can we really afford to get embroiled in a war on this basis? It seems imperative in this light that our political representatives vote “no”–an emphatic “no”–on the proposed (further) Syrian intervention.
I write a blog, and I’ve been blogging against Syrian intervention for months: https://instituteforobjectiviststudies.wordpress.com/?s=syria&submit= Please don’t hesitate to contact me for further elaboration.
I’m not particularly satisfied with the way it reads; I dashed it off somewhat hastily in one take on the “Contact” section of Frelinghuysen’s website. I’m a slow writer, and I have an unrealistic tendency to send my political representatives long, over-explanatory letters that I doubt they read, much less comprehend. But this is no time for that: the decision on Syria is imminent, and I basically just wanted Frelinghuysen to know that I stood against intervention. I’ll post his response here when I get it.
In the meantime, one’s heart sinks at the pathetic character of the supposed Congressional “opposition” to intervention, especially on the Democratic side of the aisle. Consider the priorities of this “opposition,” and its approach to political decision-making about matters of life and death:
“There are two major considerations to take into account,” said Representative Hakeem Jeffries, a freshman from New York and member of the Black Caucus. “The prestige of an administration we strongly support versus an open-ended conflict in the Middle East that risks the lives of the people we represent if war were to break out. Not to mention the diversion of resources back into our communities that sorely need it.”
I don’t know what’s worse: that Jeffries’s claim about “prestige” is racially motivated or that it’s motivated by partisan considerations. I almost find it difficult to credit the existence of a mentality that can think this way–a mentality that thinks that prestige is a normative consideration on all fours with “the lives of the people we represent if war were to break out.” What “prestige” can a regime have if its leadership thinks this way? And this is the opposition to the war!
Consider what Jeffries is saying.
Racial interpretation: I am black. The president is black. “Therefore,” the president’s prestige matters a great deal to me; after all, we’re members of the same race. Racial solidarity is a normative consideration I regard as on par with whether or not the risks of war are high or low. Which is it to take precedence: racial solidarity or the lives of the people I represent? I’m not sure, but I’d prima facie be willing to sacrifice lives for the sake of racial solidarity.
Partisan interpretation: I am a Democrat. The president is a Democrat. “Therefore,” the president’s prestige matters a great deal to me: after all, we’re members of the same party. Partisan solidarity is a normative consideration I regard as on par with whether or not the risks of war are high or low. Which is to take precedence: partisan solidarity, or the lives of the people Irepresent? I’m not sure, but I’d prima facie be willing to sacrifice lives for the sake of partisan solidarity.
Arguably, Jeffries’s claim about prestige is a matter of both racial and partisan considerations. Just start either of the preceding paragraphs with: “I am a black Democrat. The president is a black Democrat….” And you can fill in the rest. He’d be willing to sacrifice lives for the sake of racialized partisan solidarity.
We’re dealing here with a political class–to paraphrase Nietzsche–whose “therefores” are self-refutations. It almost seems an exercise in futility trying to reason with these people. But if there’s the possibility of success–the possibility of influencing the outcome of the impending vote–we really don’t have a choice.
Irfan